This paper gives an overview of the enterprise of cognitive poetics as an area of research in the intersection between cognitive science and literary studies, and examines the role of semiotics within this framework, as it pertains to the playful occupation with expressive signs characteristic of literary art, a representational practice employed in all human cultures. As a form of aesthetic pretense literary communication engages the reader in a mental sharing that, unlike everyday pragmatic communication, does not require joint attention in the sense of attending with mutual awareness to the same object at the same time. The act of literary enunciation is not framed by the participants as deictically rooted in space and time, as is practically oriented, "situated" communication, and represented contents are not intended as direct propositional depictions of observable states of affairs. In these respects literary language use presents an interesting case for semiotics, and indeed for cognitive science which by virtue of having human cognition as its subject, encompasses the realm of imagination and expressive ingenuity. Conversely, from the viewpoint of literary studies, cognitive science can be seen to provide certain epistemologica! and methodological advantages which grant literary scholars a way of thinking about their objects of study as simultaneously embodying a manifestation of unique choices and particular circumstances of production as well as being indicative of universal processes of meaning construction and interpretation. The paper aims at laying out a foundation for discussing the philosophical underpinnings of the enterprise, and raises some philosophical questions concerning literary meaning as an object of research. These issues in turn make certain methodological considerations relevant which are subsequently discussed, with a view to clarifying potential scientific objectives and illuminating existing
incongruities within cognitive poetics and literary studies as such. The paper does not aspire toward any dogmatic solutions to these matters; rather it seeks to call attention to existing problem areas and to stress the significance of upholding a basic rational attitude -here contrasted with meaning skeptidsm as a philosophical position, with Rorty's pragmatism as a prime example -as a minimum requisite motivating the various intellectual pursuits that qualify literary studies as a humanistic science. Finally, I propose the view that just as literary studies may advance by integrating insights from cognitive science, so too can cognitive science benefit from becoming progressively more attuned to aspects of the human intellect manifesting our cultural nature, not least aesthetic experiences of literary expressivity.
Cognitive Poetics

Literary language use
It remains a disputable issue to what extent intersubjectivity and semiotic interaction is unique to humans and to what extent these competencies are shared with other species. There are diverging accounts of what specific semiotic competencies separate humans from other species, and how these competencies are to be defined in theoretical terms. It is safe to say, however, that humans are the only literary species.
The emergence of literary expressiwty as a cultural practice attests to the significance of the externalization of linguistic signs into written symbols and to the fundamental predisposition for causal participation in each other's inner "theaters", to use a well-known metaphor (cf. Bernard Baars' "theater of consciousness", Baars 1997), by symbol use alone. Literary expressivity is a form of externalized communication which relies on the semiotic resources inherent in everyday enundation and its extensions beyond the everyday, practical realm by virtue of playful pretense (see also Collins 1991) . Humans have evolved a semiotic culture which proliferates communication not just for purposes of coordination and negotiation, i.e. socially and materially practical purposes, but for the sake of momentary enjoyment -jesting banter, story-telling, nonsensemaking and other non-pragmatic communication scripts, or "language games", not governed by a principal concern for factual states of affairs. Interpersonal interactions are embedded in a shared world of symbolic behavior and immaterial exchanges, allowing engagement in mental activities not direcdv related to furthering survival. Literature is the prime example of this kind of cultural excess, relying on the enjoyment of aesthetic form and on interpersonal play, factors that express a frame of mind which would be potentially dangerous to adopt in times of life-threatening crisis. 1 The production of symbolic artifacts in a play frame, rather than in a frame of (material and social) survival, is an interesting phenomenon in and of itself. Stirring our imagination seems an end in itself. The value of a symbolic artifact such as a literary work of art is primarily aesthetic. The engagement with aesthetic form in a frame of playful pretense is a step in our cultural evolution. We could call it aesthetic pretense.
In the world of non-human species, communication is adapted for practical purposes, and is grounded in attitudes relevant to the here and now. Animal communication appears to be largely, if not exclusively, concerned with states of affairs that exist in the deictic present. Even mentally advanced behaviors like pretense are oriented toward present fears and desires, and are engaged in deceptively, to advance chances of survival (cf. e.g. Munn 1986 : The deceptive use of alarm calls by sentinel species in mixed-species flocks of neotropical birds'), or as a form of practice, in preparation for critical 'here and now' situations.
Aesthetic pretense, by contrast, is not deceptive and not intrinsically tied to a desire to secure the individual's material or social standing, at the expense of others. Nor is it functional. There is a mutual "contract" between the communicating parties -sometimes described as an agreement to "suspend disbelief' (S. T. Coleridge). The suspension of disbelief has been proposed as a principle for reading fiction but perhaps it applies, in some form, to all art. Since, in art, what is represented is not intended as a direct prepositional depiction of some observable state of affairs, but as a disclosure of a more subde kind, the sincerity of the author (in the widest sense) is not afflicted by evident distortions or fabulations. A misproportioned sculpture of a human body, for instance, is not a "lie" about human bodies, and a poem that says it rains every day is not interpreted as a "lie" about the weather.
Non-deceitful pretense also occurs in everyday communication, for the sake of amusement (e.g. uttering absurdly irrelevant or nonsensical utterances simply to enjoy the absurdity of a meaningless speech act 2 ) and for pragmatic purposes (e.g. in ironic statements). Utterances issued in pretense mode direct attentional focus on the enunciation itself and to its expressive qualities (as opposed to merely focusing attention on the represented content, e.g. the enunciator's framing of some state of affairs). This is also the case in literature. However, in literature, the enunciation itself is disconnected from the deictic speech situation in which it occurs. The specific circumstances of the speech situation would be relevant to the interpretation of utterance meaning in everyday communication; in literature, that is not the case. Speaker and hearer -author and reader -are curiously unaware of each other's specific situational circumstances when the communication occurs. The communication is not framed by the participants as deictically rooted in space and time; it occurs anytime. "Literary communication" is a form of mental sharing that does not require joint (or "shared") attention in the sense of attending with mutual awareness to the same object at the same time. The pragmatic relevance of the communication, as well as the identity of the represented voice and its 2nd person addressee, is underspecified and sometimes intentionally ambiguous in the mental construal of speech situations in literature. The exact details of who is addressing who and why is usually not a pressing concern. There is a pronounced element of artificiality in the literary enunciation -an underspecification of pragmatic details.
The participants share a momentary preoccupation with things represented in a mode of non-actuality, representations set up in a semiotic base space 3 peculiarly free of situational constraints. Literature is a unique "language game", in this way. Focus is on the what and the how of communication rather than the pragmatic particulars of who, where and when. These representations -the (semantic) what and the (presentational) how -are presented in an enunciatorv mode of pretense, establishing an imagined semandc universe not identifiable with the pragmatic reality that normally motivates communication. Only through the (secondary and optional) abstraction process of Literary interpretation do the authorial enunciation and the represented content become expressly related to the world outside the text.
The gratifying experience of being playfully occupied with expressive signs in this way, sharing non-factual representations for their own sake, in the underspecified communicative setting of aesthetically oriented semiosis, constitutes a curious phenomenological proclivity in human culture, one which makes literary artifacts interesting objects of study in and of themselves. As empirically manifested occurrences of linguistic utterances, the realm of literature furthermore offers an opportunity for extensive and systematic inquiry into the cognitive mechanisms that make the creation and comprehension of literary texts possible, and of the structural features that set them apart from non-literary, pragmatically oriented ones.
This field of inquiry can be subsumed under the header of 'cognitive literary studies', a field of study which invites a variety of methodological and theoretical approaches to textual production and comprehension, in effect a collective effort dedicated to discovering and examining the workings of the semiotic mind.
The cognitive turn in poetics
From a cognitive perspective, as avowed in Mark Turner's Reading Minds -The Study of English in the Age of Cognitive Science (Turner 1991) , language, literature and mind are not separate objects of study. The integrated view of literature and mind was apparent in Reuven Tsur's work in the 1970s which incorporated formalist, structuralist and perception-oriented research. A frontrunner in the study of literary creations in a cognitive perspective, Tsur delved into the relation between literary structure and effect, continuing the work of Russian formalists and Czech and French structuralists, as he was working toward a Theory of Cognitive Poetics (Tsur 1992) .
As a multifaceted theoretical and practical approach to literary studies, "cognitive poetics" was also precipitated by the semiotics of the late 70s, most notably the work of Umberto Eco and Yuri Lotman, and by the cognitive turn within linguistics, with the emergence of a "cognitive" linguistics, taking an active interest in the conceptual basis for language. In a similar vein, Jonathan Culler's "structuralist poetics" in the mid-70s (Culler 1975) endeavored to define the conditions of meaning rather than to discover new meanings in particular texts.
Though cognitive poetics borrows from Saussurian semiotics and structuralism, one main difference lies in the view of language as grounded in embodied cognition and universal human experience. Language is not arbitrary, as the structuralists would have it; our linguistic and conceptual systems are two sides of the same coin. "Language is inseparable from conceptual thought; conceptual thought in turn is inseparable from what it means to have a human body and lead a human life" (Turner 1991: 17) . Consequently, the study of meaning entails taking the underlying cognitive mechanisms into account, such as, for instance, the way we categorize objects and events (see e.g. Lakoff 1987 ), prior to naming them, or the mechanisms of conceptualization underlying literary tropes like metaphor (see e.g. Lakoff & Turner 1989 ).
Whereas Lakoff and Turner were reluctant to describe their approach in terms of an ambition to rethink literary criticism (Lakoff & Turner 1989: 159) , Turner, in his 1991 book, set out to ground literary criticism in cognitive rhetoric. The intelligibility of literary texts became the subject of analysis, on the basis of a view of language according to which linguistic meaning is systematically motivated by commonplace conceptual patterns. It was in this perspective that he proposed "reconsidering and reframing the study of language, literature, and mind" (Turner 1991: vii) . "These studies will take things that we do automatically and unconsciously, slow us way down, and ask us to investigate how we do them" (p. 25). The ambition was driven largely by a curiosity toward the workings of the imaginative mind as a distinctly human attribute. The cognitive turn within the humanities, in effect, meant turning toward the discovery of the mind. "The imagination must move in a known space; these are the conditions upon its intelligibility. The attempt to ground literary criticism in cognitive rhetoric is no other than the attempt to map that space in which the imagination moves so that we can understand the performance of imagination within it" (p. 247). The view of the humanities inherent in the formulation of these objectives straddles the divide between nature and culture, making a research object of cultural cognition as an identifiable aspect of human cognition. 4 The paradigmatic shift implied entails the inclusion of cognitive inquiries in the humanities, and conversely, the inclusion of culture in the cognitive sciences. "I propose a revised concept of the humanities as the inquiry into what constitutes human beings and human acts. I take language and thought as constitutive of what is human. On this view, the fundamental activity of the humanities is the discover}' of the nature of human language and human thought" (p. 47).
The study of language to which I look forward would analyze the nature and processes of this conceptual apparatus, its expression in language, and its exploitation in literature. It would see literary language as continuous with common language, and meaning as tied to conventional conceptual structures that inform both common and literary language in a continuous and systematic manner. Our profession touches home base when it contributes to the systematic inquiry into these linguistic and literary acts as acts of the human mind (pp. 17-18).
Though the view of literary language as continuous with common language calls for elaborative clarification, it will by the least contentious interpretation imply that literary language relies on the ability to creatively exploit resources that are already in place. By contrast to the more romantic notion of divine inspiration and genius, this framework ascribes the originality' of an author to "an exploitation of the dominant unoriginal apparatus at his disposal" (p. 19) -an anti-romantic idea, inasmuch as the creativity is thought to lie not in ingenious poetic invention but in the exploitation of available means.
There is a tendency in cognitive poetics to see a continuous development from everyday language to literary language, much in the same way a continuum exists between our conceptual apparatus and the linguistic means by which we express the contents of our minds. Because poetic language use depends on the general linguistic and conceptual means at our disposal, understanding the conceptual mechanisms underlying language is important not only for linguists but also for theoreticians who aspire to explain how literary expressivity is made possible and how individual manifestations of poetic expressions acquire the meanings that readers interpret them as having. Studies in cerebral dysfunction can be useful (cf. e.g. Jakobson's use of aphasia research), and, likewise, Talmy's cognitive semantics exhibits a great potential for illumination, as well as Langacker's cognitive grammar which explains linguistic phenomena with reference to general principles of "ception", to use a term coined by Talmy (Talmy 1996) , capturing the idea of a gradient continuum between perception and conception. These studies, along with other prominent approaches in cognitive semantics, have enlightened our understanding of language use traditionally thought of as 'non-standard', such as metaphor, a central phenomenon in poetry. Furthermore, cognitive semantics and cognitive grammar provide means of accounting for linguistic ambiguities and apparent poetical styles of thought in particular poems, and also, importandy, for explaining how ungrammatical constructions in poetic texts are nevertheless interpreted as conveying intelligible conceptual meanings, despite their aberrant deviation from accepted norms of well-formedness, by pragmatic standards. 5 Though more attention could perhaps be afforded to probing the specifically aesthetic aspects of literary language use, it seems sound, at least to some degree, to equate the literary mind with the everyday mind, as Turner does in his 1996 book (The Literary Mind).
Temporal, causational and associative -and in this sense narrativeimagining is our fundamental form of predicting, evaluating, planning and explaining, as he writes (Turner 1996: 20) . "Partitioning the world into objects involves partitioning the world into small spatial stories because our recognition of objects depends on the characteristic stories in which they appear [...] ". This non-essentialist take on object recognition is in accord with the contemporary view of how categorization works (see e.g. Glenberg 1997) . One way to engage creatively with these "stories" is through conceptual integration, i.e. blending, one of the mechanisms of imagination explored in Turner's book. "Blends can be constructed if two stories can be construed as sharing abstract structure" (Turner 1996: 87 with its predecessor, mental space theory (see e.g. Elena Semino's mental space analysis of a short story by Hemingway in Gavins & Steen 2003 ; see also Gavins' 'text world theory' analysis of a Barthelme novel, id.): "Gilles Fauconnier has produced an elegant theory of the ways in which language prompts us to construct mental spaces and correspondences between mental spaces, a theory that seems to offer tools and methods for the literary critic concerned with the reader's mental construction of fictive realities" (Turner 1991: 21) .
At the turn of the century a number of anthologies, special issues and introductory monographs emerged, exploring the cognitive faculties and mental operations (Semino and Culpeper 2002) , Narrative Theory and the Cognitive Säences (Herman 2003) , Poetics Today, two special issues [2002] [2003] . In these works, authors explored subjects such as figure/ground structure, frames, schémas, mental space structure, narratology, temporal structure, viewpoint structure, voice, deixis, literary stylistics, scripts, attention, memory and information processing, emotion, parable, and the notion of symmetry in art: "grasping the symmetries of a poem is understanding its structure" (Turner 1991: 90) . As explicated by Turner, and others, poetic invention and all acts of language are seen as relying on a common background conceptual system, warranting the inclusion in poetic studies of subjects such as: image-schemas, event-shapes, bodily symmetry, force dynamics, category structures etc. In Cognitive Poetics in Practice, for instance, Ray Gibbs takes on the issue of cognitive prototypes. Rather than seeing meaning construction as dependent upon the access of pre-stored prototypes, Gibbs argues that we create meaningful construals by embodied simulation, purporting a view of text understanding as "a dynamic activity that relies on concrete, often embodied information, which people creatively compose in the moment of reading" (Gibbs 2003: 29) . According to this view, "prototypical concepts [are to be seen] as temporary constructions in working memory constructed on the spot from generic and episodic information in long-term memory, rather than as stable structures stored in long-term memory" (p. 32). While some issues are introduced into literary studies on account of contemporary research, such as for instance the research in experimental psychology on categorization mechanisms made widely accessible via Lakoffs 1987 publication Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things, other issues date back at least as far as Aristotle's Poetics, e.g. the emotive dimension of literary texts (cf. e.g. Oatley 2003 , Tsur 2003 , and Freeman 2008 . A subject of enduring interest to literary scholars despite changing paradigms and which remains central in cognitivepoetic studies is metaphor. Cognitive-poetic analyses of metaphor typically aim at discovering or exposing the stable conceptual metaphors that underlie particular expressive forms and view metaphors in terms of source and target domains structured by image-schemas derived from embodied experience (see e.g. Lakoff & Turner 1989 , Turner 1991 , and Crisp 2003 ; on the philosophical origins of the embodied view of meaning, imagination and reasoning see Freeman 2002) . The uncovering of underlying conceptual structure may be an end in itself, or it may serve to illuminate interpretations of individual texts as manifestations of literary expressivity, as in Brandt & Brandt (2005a) , where the metaphoric expressions themselves are analyzed as contributing to the semantic meaning of a particular poem (for a step-by-step explication of the theoretical framework applied, see also Brandt & Brandt 2005b ).
Language as expressive discourse
For the literary analyst, language, and hence also conceptual content, is naturally seen as originating in enunciation, whether belonging to an author or to staged fictive enunciators, and linguistic utterances are therefore (implicidy or explicitly) viewed as located in expressive semiosis. Language, and meaning construction generally, is thus inherently viewed in a semiotic framework.
As has been pointed out in Brandt & Kjorup (2008, in press ), Semino (forthcoming 2008), and Jackson (2005) , it is important for the appeal of participation in (cognitive) literary studies that the incorporation into the discipline of cognitive science not lead to the neglect of the expressive dimension of language of special importance to literary scholars, in favor of a one-sided search for cognitive structures, that is, for cognitive phenomena not of particular relevance to individual texts or to literature at large, making cognition rather than literature the primary focal point. An instance of this kind of one-sided search would be analyses exclusively directed at the identification of conceptual metaphors, which reduces the literary text to a source of data, on par with other -non-literary -empirical manifestations of language use such as presidential speeches and letters from the 1RS. For cognitive literary studies to appeal to literary scholars, the subject will have to remain literature. From the perspective of someone primarily occupied with expressivity, and particularly literary expressivity, conceptual metaphors, categorization effects and other general features of cognition are regarded as relevant by virtue of bringing about the meanings apprehended in the reading of texts, that is, in the specific discursive contexts in which they are active.
Granted, there are various possible approaches to the enterprise of cognitive literary studies (e.g. a primarily linguistic approach), but in so far as the attentional emphasis reflects the weighting indicated by the predicate structure of the name, 'cognitive' being a predicate modifying the noun phrase 'literary studies', or 'poetics', it would seem natural the chief investment be allocated to the relation between expression and meaning, between literary rhetoric and semantic content at the various levels of interpretation. To neglect the question of how a text achieves the potential to prompt the construction of particular meanings and to evoke particular feeling qualities is to neglect the text as an instance of writing, in focusing solely on invariant mechanisms of cognition one may overlook the variations of expression that are also prominent in the semiotic cognition of literary text. Analytic sensitivity to the particular ways in which meanings arise in a text is essential to textual analysis and to the understanding of literary cognition, a language-oriented mental activity specially attuned to picking up stylistic nuance. As observed in Semino (2008), we need stylistic analysis "in order to account for the meaning potential of texts." Semino cautions against shifting focus away from the expressive dimension of literary language use: This observation brings to the forefront the issue of enunciational context, in relation to the interpretation of meaning. In linguistics, signifieds are often presented as independently definable meanings prompted by signifying sentences not motivated by a context of discourse but constructed by the linguist to fulfill some illustrative purpose. In literature, sentences appear as parts of a larger discourse; they are spoken by someone. Subsequently, meanings are interpreted as a function of specific circumstances of communica-tion, be they authorial or represented; all linguistic and extralinguistic units of meaning, including sentences, belong to the enunciation of the poet/storyteller/playwright or of represented poetic, narrative or dramatic voices.
Semino's cautionary comment indirectly calls attention to the issue of meaning as related to its occurrence in discourse: the immediate contextual environment of signifying elements ("co-text") and the contextual staging of the text as belonging to a (e.g. literary) genre and a specific authorship. The enunciational, compositional and linguistic choices made call for stylistic characterization; the identification of general, underlying semantic structures does not exhaust the analytic exploration because, as Semino points out, it misses the aspect of expressive realization, an aspect especially significant for literary discourse. The same underlying (e.g. narrative) structures can be expressed in various ways; an analysis focused solely on general semantic attributes will miss the question of how interpretation is affected by the particular expressive choices made. The expressive quality of the discourse itself, i.e. the text as text, is a crucial aspect of literary meaning.
Placing theoretical emphasis on the analytic examination of stylistic variables suggests a view of language which is primarily communicationoriented, locating meaning in the expressive act of semiosis.
7 The foregrounding of the expressive function of language, connecting disparate minds via signs, entails an analytic mind-set that is essentially semiotic.
8
The indispensability of semiotic analysis is clearly articulated in Eco's take on textual criticism: Under such a view, textual criticism is equally concerned with constants and with variables (p. 172); theory sketches out the constants, and criticism highlights the variables. Though it is not identified as such, this approach seems compatible with cognitive poetics approaches to literature, sharing one of its main concerns: explaining not the effect (e.g. pathos, enchantment, unease) but "the grammar of its production" (p. 178). Insofar as cognitive poetics be thought of as encompassing the discipline of textual criticism, Eco's explication offers a perspective on the analytic task which addresses the concern expressed by Semino and which makes it evident why the hermeneutic dimension of literary studies is naturally relevant for any literary theory that has literary text as its primary object of interest.
Methodological considerations
In the following, I argue against the view that cognitive literary studies can logically encompass and subsume any individual theories within literary studies, even if these should happen to be internally incompatible with each other. I argue here that, on logical grounds, a commitment to the universality of cognition, i.e. to coalition as a human universal, and to epistemic force as a parameter for evaluating scientific claims, are indispensable, if the modifier 'cognitive' is to be applied to the subject of 'poetics' in a consistent and meaningful manner. By 'epistemic force' I refer to the force of argument with a view to obtaining knowledge; the notion of epistemic force is contrasted in Sweetser 1990 with physical, social and speech-act force in her analysis of modal force. Though embracing diversity within the field of cognitive poetics, encompassing various disciplines and methods, I discuss Richard Rorty's pragmatism as a radical example of a philosophical stance that, by virtue of its denial of the existence of truth and falsity, and its indifference to logical contradiction, stands in opposition to the endeavor of scientific inquiry, and specifically inquiry into phenomena which the pragmatist claims not to existsuch as cognition, including, of course, literary cognition. Naturally, theoretical variants which share Rorty's -essentially anti-cognitive -philosophical stance will fall subject to the same criticisms as are directed here against Rorty's version of Pragmatism. Despite the existing variation within the field of cognitive poetics, it stands to reason that theories which explicitly deny the existence of cognitive universals and the ontological relevance of venturing propositions as such cannot unproblematically be fitted into, or deemed compatible with, theories making propositional claims about cognitive processes of literary production and comprehension.
On the basis of this discussion, I outline some issues concerning cognitive poetics as an interdisciplinary empirical science. Rather than forging an exhaustive list of available methodologies, this section seeks to clarify the underlying rationale for evolving these different methods of discovery and to expand on the ontological presumptions motivating cognitive poetics as a diverse and yet unified field.
In the next section, I argue that one of the central concerns in a cognitive poetics remains semiotic analysis of meaning, and relate this basic assumption to the empirical ideal of testability. The notion of falsification is discussed as a parameter present in meaning analysis, though the practice of falsification differs from its counterpart in the natural sciences, given the ontological properties of the objects of inquiry. Common to the different dimensions of cognitive poetics is a preoccupation with the processes involved in the interpretation of signs. Different aspects of these processes are studied by use of a variety of methods, including ones belonging to the realm of natural science, and, although the issue remains literary texts, insights from disciplines outside of literary studies (psychology, linguistics etc.) are sought integrated with literary subject matter when deemed useful -either to elucidate old ideas or to evolve new ones. My proposal at the end of this section concerns the relation between cognitive science and poetics. I envision a two-way relation to the advantage of both. Not only does poetics benefit from perspectives offered by research within cognitive science; cognitive poetics might in turn inspire the wider community of cognitive scientists to become more attuned to the phenomenological experience, and not least cultural dimensions, of human cognition.
Epistemic versus social force
The emergence of a cognitive approach to language and literature in the humanities does not necessarily entail philosophical and theoretical homogeneity. As a scholarly field cognitive poetics may develop into an inherendy heterogeneous field of study which exists without a set of theoretical assumptions on which everyone can agree. Heterogeny is to be expected within any field of study, not least one characterized by interdisciplinarity. However, it would seem useful, still, to strive towards defining the various different disciplines within cognitive poetics, as they emerge, so that, within each discipline, scholars may reach a sufficient degree of preliminary consensus on the philosophical, theoretical and methodological foundational premises for conducting the kind of intra-disciplinary dialogue necessary for scientific progress.
It is hard to tell to what extent the already existing diversity is an indication of an inevitable state of affairs and to what degree it can be ascribed to the newness of the field and the characteristic growing pains that accompany any new advances of this sort, in science and elsewhere. Perhaps cognitive poetics will become a field composed of a variety of disciplines which complement each other, or perhaps instead it will bifurcate into separate fields, with different takes on what is implied by the predicate "cognitive" and with mutually exclusive scientific objectives.
According to the view expressed by Turner below, "a cognitive approach" may be interpreted by different scholars in a variety of ways and the emerging theories may vary, even to the point of incompatibility.
A cognitive approach to linguistic and literary acts could potentially serve as common ground for many different theories of literature, conflicting with none of them, however incompatible they might be with each other (Turner 1991: 22 ).
It appears a realistic assessment that differing theories will emerge, while each identifying with the label "a cognitive approach". However, what would motivate theorists to carry on debates across allegedly incompatible theoretical disciplines? It is difficult to see how theories of literature which do not view themselves as part of a scientific debate can take part in debates within the umbrella approach of cognitive poetics (and such theories are presumably encompassed in Turner's reference to "many different theories of literature" -more on these theories follows below). In this light, it is more likely that the notion of irreconcilability should apply, such that, instead, the proposal reads "a cognitive approach to linguistic and literary acts could potentially serve as common ground for many different theories of literature, conflicting with none of them, however irreconcilable they might be with each other", grounding the divergence not in logical incompatibility but in an assessment of the social reality of academia.
It would seem proponents of incompatible theories would lack motivation to engage each other, and so it is hard to see on what grounds these theories could realistically be subsumed as belonging to the same field of study, sharing a common denominator such as "cognitive poetics".
I would be wary of accepting beforehand that divergence be characterized in terms of incompatibility rather than divergence of conviction, because it precludes the possibility of clarifying specific points of disagreement via argumentation. Seeming incompatibility between different directions within cognitive literary studies may amount to disagreements that prolonged discussions would sort out.
Constitutional incompatibility preemptively closes off the possibility for scientific dialogue between advocates for different theories in precluding sustained negotiation of theoretical developments. And what, after all, does a field of study consist in if not sustained negotiation of theoretical developments? The incompatibility label in effect removes the conditions for a joint enterprise.
Incompatibility presumably involves not only divergence of conviction but also divergence in standards for what counts as support for or against one's convictions. An illustrative, though somewhat radical, example of incompatible fields of discourse would be the classic case of scientific versus religious discourse, where each engage different standards of inquiry: argumentation/evidence versus authority/faith. Within a particular academic field, linguistics for instance, claiming incompatibility, say between generative and non-generative syntactic theories, in effect amounts to a decision to stop listening to each other's arguments. Rarely, if ever, does such a decision stem from an acknowledgement of a persistent and irrefutable divergence in standards for what counts as support for or against a given set of convictions.
It would seem more productive, then, to view variation within the field of cognitive poetics as instances of either divergence of interest, leading to contrasting inquiries, or divergence in the assessment of particular phenomena, leading to contrasting theories.
Relative to the field of literary studies, cognitive poetics is a sub-field, encompassing a number of (actual and potential) disciplines and theoretical approaches. What ties these together, and what sets them apart from other sub-fields in literary studies? As noted earlier, the predicate "cognitive" invokes a perspective in which literary production and comprehension are conceived of as functions of the cognitive apparatus at our disposal, most prominently cognitive mechanisms oriented towards the processing of signs and the creation of textual coherence and aesthetic effect. In this view, humans are primarily products of the evolutionary development of natural -and naturally culturalcognition, as opposed to historically contingent and socially negotiated constructions (cf. the notion of social construction as a primary generative force). Linguistic signs are seen as grounded in cognition -a view to be contrasted with meaning skepticism as a philosophical position (questioning the existence of stable and communicable meanings) as well as the idea of semiotic recursion (signs referring to signs referring to signs ad infinitum).
Since it is evident that the meaning of individual literary texts cannot be accounted for exclusively in terms of universal cognitive mechanisms (i.e. procedures for processing particular types of information, e.g. mechanisms of emotive responsiveness or conscious/sub-conscious inferential procedures), nor solely by reference to particular circumstances of time, place and person, it remains a pending question how to arrive at a balanced and realistic elucidation of, in the words of Adler and Gross, "the relationship and relative weight and scope of cognitive universals and cultural particulars" (Adler & Gross 2002: 211) . This, I believe, ought to be treated as an empirical question.
The perspective according to which semiotic exchanges (e.g. text production and comprehension) is conceived of as fundamentally shaped by cognition has not taken root within all of contemporary humanistic science and, interestingly, not even entirely within cognitive poetics itself. There is a philosophical dimension to these issues, concerning the nature of human mind and the existence or non-existence of meanings stable enough to enter into a proposition-based discourse such as the scientific one. The latter issue is of great consequence to scientific practice since it affects standpoints on the possibility of formulating and testing scientific hypotheses (which rely on stable meanings) as well as the introspective practice of interpreting texts.
A debated and currently unresolved issue in literary studies concerns the issue of whether or not the cognitive approach is compatible with poststructuralist theory. In a paper entitled "Darwin and Derrida: Cognitive Literary Theory As a Species of Post-Structuralism", Ellen Spolsky argues for the possibility of merging an evolutionary and neuro-cognitive perspective on man with Derridean ideas on representation, claiming that, contran' to what might be assumed, "an evolutionary cognitive perspective actually nestles nicely within a central niche of deconstructionist thinking, that is, the critique of representa-tion" (Spolsky 2002: 43) , and proposing that "the cognitive study of literature" be viewed as situated within the post-structuralist paradigm (p. 56).
Opposing this view Motti Benari describes the working hypothesis underlying cognitive poetics as an alternative to the more well-established poststructuralist approach, only cognitive studies have launched this new approach so discreedy that its status as an approach that undermines the preceding one has almost gone unnoticed:
For many years now Cognitive Studies (Cognitive Poetics, Cognitive Linguistics and Cognitive Pragmatics) have been nurturing a hypothesis, alternative to Post-Structuralism, without explicitly saying so, i.e., without making the waves typically needed for undermining a preceding wellestablished approach. According to cognitive studies -theory is far from dead, subjectivity can never tell the whole story, and an endless number of variables can still be placed in a formula. Post-Structuralism's focus on the reader's subjectivity cannot refute the argument that effects are being caused, that we can analyze the potential of certain texts to cause particular effects, and that actual effects can be explained by an analysis of cognitive reaction to identifiable means. Subjective interpretation is constrained by basic cognitive abilities, cognitive preferences/tendencies, and by the set of stimuli that trigger and promote certain processes while inhibiting others (Benari 2004: 182) .
There is an underlying premise of intersubjectivity in Benari's approach to literary studies. The implied intersubjectivity is a form of objectivity, in that all humans share the world as it presents itself to us, given our cognitive faculties. These faculties do not vary substantially, though of course there is some degree of variation in the way we employ them, individually or as a group, i.e. within a particular community. Insofar as the subject matter is not private (e.g. one's favorite color), one person's subjectivity is not in principle inaccessible to another subjectivity; we connect through joint attention and communication.
In contrast to readings which take as a starting point an ability to mutually attend to something via language and to interpret utterances in a communicative framework, there is the "symptomatic" style of reading characterized by Eco in a critique of the deconstructionist approach to representation: " [...] there is a deep sense concealed everywhere, that every discourse uses the symbolic mode, that every utterance is constructed along the isotopy of the unsaid, even when it is as simple as, "It's raining today." This is today's deconstructionist heresy, which seems to assume that a divinity or malign subconscious made us talk always and only with a second meaning, and that everything we say is inessential because the essence of our discourse lies elsewhere, in a symbolic realm we are often unaware of' (Eco 2002: 157) .
Given the epistemic and cultural relativism inherent in the deconstructionist approach to meaning, it is difficult to see how exacdy one arrives at a notion (cf. e.g. Spolskv) of cognitive poetics as a discipline subordinate to deconstructionist literary studies. The 'relativism' of cognitive studies consists in acknowledging that our cognitive apparatus constrains our access to and perception of actual and possible states of affairs (i.e. reality); in this sense, reality and meaning are mind-dependent (a view to be contrasted with the analytic view which equates meanings with propositions and meaningfulness with truthfulness). 'Truthfulness' is an assessment to be made relative, not to yet another "discourse", but to cognitively motivated conceptualizations of states of affairs (a view to be contrasted with a recursive view of meaning where discourse can only refer to yet more discourse). The cognitive conceptions of meaning (granting there are variations) do not entail dismissing the practice of evaluating theoretical claims based on degrees of correspondence between propositional meanings and states of affairs. The view of meaning and reality as construed from a human, and therefore universally accessible, perspective, stands in contrast to the deconstructionist concern with the speaker's unsaid (e.g. cultural/ideologically motivated) premises for speaking and the skeptical/incredulous stance towards the possibility of scientific advance through increasingly accurate and inclusive descriptions of states of affairs, a possibility that rests on a presumed ability to evaluate the accuracy of propositions and to correct false statements through observation and argument.
While the latter perspective on representation approaches -e.g. literarymeaning (see below) from an inherently skeptical viewpoint, or a standpoint of active disbelief, the cognitive approach takes it as an empirical fact that humans are able to share meanings via communicated signs (e.g. the tide and sentences of a text) and sets out to account for how this is in fact possible (what cognitive mechanisms affect this evident ability and how specific meanings come about). Grounding discourse on poetics in argumentation from examinable premises (findings on the conditions of interpretive cognition) yields a theoretical basis for evaluating instances of reading, analysis, interpretation, and critique, evaluations which are themselves potentially subject to further review and appraisal.
The relative stability of textual meanings (refuted by meaning skepticists) is fundamental to the praxis of cognitive-poetic analysis. However, as mentioned above, there are variations in the theories of meaning employed by different practitioners of cognitive poetics, for instance concerning the parameter of conscious accessibility. Some place emphasis on the prominence of unconsáous cognitive activity involved in meaning construction and include the 'unconscious' in the realm of inquiry (cf. e.g. Turner) . This inclusion implies a theory of meaning which does not take the presence of intentional motivation as a defining factor in characterizing meaning. Additionally, there is the conception of meaning employed in the field of cognitive semiotics, according to which meaning originates in an expressive subjecthood. By this definition meaning is intentionally motivated; it is a feature of signs used in expressive acts. Meaning is therefore in principle accessible to conscious awareness. This is not to say that we are necessarily always aware of everything going on in our minds during an act of representation; it is possible, for instance, to speak, or read and understand, grammatical sentences without having online awareness of the syntactic rules employed. As a field of study cognitive semiotics includes the mental realm that lies outside of introspectively accessible awareness but deals with unconscious cognitive processes only insofar as there are available strategies for supporting, and, importantly, finding fault with one's hypotheses and analyses.
Common to the different contemporary varieties of cognitive-poetic theories of meaning is a replacement of both objectivist and relativist philosophy with the notion of a human mind as a starting point for analysis and exploration. Any cognitive theory would have to deny some fundamental beliefs in post-structuralist theory. Richard Rorty's pragmatism, for instance, holds as a basic tenet that neither texts nor reading have a nature (Rorty 1992: 105) . Sympathetic to deconstructionist philosophy, Rorty also rejects the philosophical distinction "between language and fact, between signs and nonsigns" (p. 98). According to this philosophy, assertions cannot be checked against states of affairs, but only against other assertions.
Rorty furthermore denies a distinction between reality and appearance (p. 108), yet insists that "illusion" is possible: "[juxtaposing different works by different authors] may be so exciting and convincing that one has the illusion that one now sees what a certain text is really about" (p. 105). This, by any logical measure, would seem a contradiction, as would the notion of evaluating ideas. Rorty nonetheless finds himself able to compare propositions and evaluate them as "bad": "For us pragmatists, the notion that [proposition 1] is as bad as the Aristotelian idea that [proposition 2]" (p. 102). Given that assertions cannot be checked against states of affairs, how is this possible? The answer seems to lie in the evocation of the self-inclusive community: "For us pragmatists [...]", a communal arbiter of taste as a faith-based authority. Forces of argument are replaced by the private inclinations and disinclinations of this community (e.g. "My disinclination to admit that any text can say such a thing, (p. 97, my italics), a self-appointed tasting panel who "deplore", "relish", "wish" etc: "This is exactly the sort of distinction anti-essentialists like me deplore [...] " (p. 93, my italics); "We pragmatists relish this way of blurring the distinction between finding an object and making it" (p. 97, my italics); "We ìvish that he had dropped the idea that [proposition]" (p. 102, my italics).
In the absence of argumentation, these expressions of group will (e.g. "This is not the sort of belief we pragmatists wish to encourage." p. 108) easily come to sound like potential threats. If not by persuasion, by what force should someone disinclined to drop his idea be deterred?
Epistemic force is manifestly replaced by the social force of a group with a joint agenda or individual momentary whims: "[...] some particular purpose, some particular intentio which we happen, at the moment, to have" (p. 98, italics in original). You can join in the camaraderie, befriend the group, and do and say what "we like" (p. 97), or you can hold on to your idea and be excluded. This is the logic of social force, when rationality is set out of motion.
In "What Ever Happened to Reason", Scruton suggests that the intentio of the enunciational first person plural is to be identified with an ethos of political correctness. He argues that the new relativism of the postmodern tradition has a political agenda, which manifests itself in paradoxically absolutist ways, to the exclusion of those who disagree (Scruton 1999): While holding that all cultures are equal and judgment among them absurd, the new relativism covertly appeals to the opposite belief. It is in the business of convincing us that Western culture, and the traditional curriculum, are racist, ethnocentric, patriarchal, and therefore beyond the pale of political acceptability. False though these accusations are, they presuppose the very universalist vision that they declare to be impossible. Their arguments belong to a new species of theolog}·: the theolog}· of political correctness. As in all theology, it is not the quality of the argument, but the nature of the conclusion, that renders the discussion acceptable. The relativist beliefs exist because they sustain a community -the new ummah of the rootless and the disaffected. Hence, in Rorty, Derrida, and Foucault, we find a shared duplicity of purpose: on the one hand to undermine all claims to absolute truth and on the other hand to uphold the orthodoxies upon which their congregation depends. The very reasoning that sets out to destroy the ideas of objective truth and absolute value imposes political correctness as absolutely binding and cultural relativism as objectively true (Scruton 1999) . Rorty, LB] or literary studies [as did Fish, LB], by identifying the difficulties and inconsistencies of their elders' conceptions of the field and by proposing alternative procedures and goals, have, once they attain professional eminence, suddenly turned and rejected the idea of a system of procedures and body of knowledge where argument is possible and presented the field as simply a group of people reading books and trying to say interesting things about them. They thus seek systematically to destroy the structure through which they attained their positions and which would enable others to challenge them in their turn. Stanley Fish [author of'Is there a text in this class ', 1980] , for instance, established himself by offering theoretical arguments about the nature of literary meaning and the role of the reading process and claiming that his predecessors who had pronounced on this topic were wrong. Once he had reached a position of eminence, however, he turned around and said, 'Actually, there isn't anything here one could be right or wrong about; there isn't such a thing as the nature of literature or of reading; there are only groups of readers and critics with certain beliefs who do whatever it is that they do. And there is no way in which other readers can challenge what I do because there is no position outside belief from which the validity of a set of beliefs could be adjudicated.' This is a less happy version of what Rorty [...] calls 'Pragmatist's progress'. Richard Rorty's own Philosophy and the Mirror of Na/ure is a powerful work of philosophical analysis precisely because it grasps the philosophical enterprise as a system with a structure and shows the contradictory relations between various parts of that structure -relations which put in question the foundational character of that enterprise. To tell people they should give up attempting to identify underlying structures and systems but just use texts for their own purposes is to attempt to block other people from doing work like that for which he gained recognition. Similarly, it is all very well to say that students of literature should not bother trying to understand how literature works but should just enjoy it or read on in the hope of finding a book that will change their life. Such a vision of literary study, though by denying any public structure of argument in which the young or marginalized could challenge the views of those who currendy occupy positions of authority in literary studies, helps make those positions unassailable and in effect confirms a structure in place by denying that there is a structure (Culler 1992: 118-119) .
What Rorty puts forth as the guiding principle constraining the pragmatist's progress, in replacement of impersonal standards of argumentation, is the notion of usefulness. As a parameter for evaluation, the notion of usefulness can be interpreted in two ways. Both these interpretations present pressing philosophical and ethical problems. By one interpretation, the degree of usefulness is assessed relative to a -singular or plural -first person subject: the predicate 'useful' applies insofar as the discursive acts in question are in compliance with the desires of a private person or of a community. Alternatively, by a definition that aspires toward independence from the idiosyncrasies of private or group aspirations, the concept of usefulness implies the notion of truth explicitly rejected.
As indicated by Scruton, the result is either an unsuccessful elimination of correspondence theory, or an arbitrary and potentially dangerous authentication of existing power structures.
Crudely put, pragmatism is the view that "true" means "useful." The most useful belief is the one that gives me the best handle on the world: the belief that, when acted upon, holds out the greatest prospect of success. Obviously that is not a sufficient characterization of the difference between the true and the false. Anyone seeking a career in an American university will find feminist beliefs useful, just as racist beliefs were useful to the university apparatchik in Nazi Germany. But this hardly shows those beliefs to be true.
So what do we really mean by "useful"? One suggestion is this: a belief is useful when it is part of a successful theory. But a successful theory is one that makes true predictions. Hence we have gone round in a circle, defining truth by utility and utility by truth. Indeed, it is hard to find a plausible pragmatism that does not come down to this: that a true proposition is one that is useful in the way that true propositions are useful. Impeccable, but vacuous (Scruton 1999) .
To engage in dialogue in a meaningful way the parties engaged have to be in agreement on the premises for the dialogue -premises for evaluating each other's arguments and for what counts as a convincing point etc. From this point of view, it is inherendy meaningless to argue against a position which rejects argument as the means by which conclusions are reached.
The consequence of abandoning the academic standard of approximating accuracy through argument appears to be an acceptance of a pre-Aquinian conflation of discovery and revelation. If observations of evident selfcontradictions do not exert any epistemic force, what force remains to guide the progress of scholarly achievement but the force of faith?
It would seem no coincidence, then, that Rorty use the term "sermon" to describe his piece on Gadamer in London Review of Books entided "Being that can be understood is language" (Rorty 2000) . 9 Just as genres of discourse are
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In his "sermon" on Gadamer's sentence 'Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache', Rorty quotes Gadamer for saying that "the interpreter's own horizon is decisive, not as a standpoint of which he is convinced or which he insists on, but rather as a possible opinion he puts into play and at risk." There are no convictions, only opinions in Rorty's conception of intellectual activity. "We [who agree with Gadamer's slogan Έεύ^ that can be understood is language"] shall be careful not to explicate the distinction between lesser and greater blurred, so is the distinction between the institutions housing them: under the circumstances described, it appears a matter of nomenclature to uphold a distinction between an academy and a congregation. In the church of Language as Being, academic success is to be identified with the achievement of successfully producing discourse that coheres with the discourse that the communal "we" has given the stamp of approval, i.e. the language use that the authorities "like" and hence deem permissible.
Taking these considerations into account, it would seem a pressing issue for Cognitive Poetics to clarify its commitment. Insofar as one is committed to making veridical claims about literary phenomena, claims that may vary in their degree of truth and accuracy (allowing for the possibility of being mistaken), methodology is a relevant subject for discussion. There needs to be some set of understanding with the help of a distinction between appearance and reality." According to this gospel, everyone should "give up", "drop", "sweep aside", "resist", and basically stop asking probing questions about what is and is not real. Problem-solving activity should be abandoned because "no description of an object is more true to the nature of that object than any other" and "there are no privileged descriptions". " [T] he very idea of ontological status should be dropped." Rorty's 'no problem' theory (which does not want to be a theory because by its own claim verification and falsification are phallogocentric illusions) proposes that one should adopt the opinion that sentences only refer to other sentences (which refer to other sentences etc.). "To replace the appearance-reality distinction with the distinction between a limited and a more extensive range of descriptions would be to abandon the idea of the text or thing we are discussing (the Sache) as something separated from us by the abyss that separates language from non-language." Instead of qualitative evaluations of interpretations, the value of the various (equally valid) interpretations should be measured quantitatively: "to understand something better is to have more to say about it". Argumentation is a useless discipline; instead of convincing other people through argument, one should strive to "get other people to use one's vocabulary". When the distinction between appearance and reality has been swept aside, i.e. when the Pragmatist has got other people to use his vocabulary, a "herrschaftsfrei' Gadamerian culture will emerge. In such a herrschaftsfm culture people will gently encourage each other to use their vocabulary. Those who have the most descriptions will get other people to adopt these descriptions and will in this respect be more powerful than those who fail to come up with comprehensive and innovatively integrated descriptions, but it will be a gentle kind of power (by contrast to the "phallogocentric" kind). There will be "no use for faculties called 'reason' or 'imagination' -faculties which are conceived as having some special relation to truth or reality". In this philosophical utopia (there will not be any philosophers but) historians of philosophy will choose the vocabulary that enables them "to describe as many past figures as possible as taking part in a single, coherent conversation." People will peacefully assemble to carry on conversations which will be meaningful in so far as the participants succeed in sharing vocabulary. Rorty expresses hope that his readers will share in his enthusiasm for the prospect of this utopia where "[e]very area of culture would be expected to have its own parochial description of every other area of culture, but nobody will ask which of these descriptions gets that idea right" (Rorty 2000) .
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jointly agreed upon (epistemologica!) standards in place for a productive, scientific dialogue to take place.
Cognitive poetics as an empirical science
At this point, the phenomenon of literary cognition has perhaps not been sufficiendy described as to warrant the announcement of a consistent new paradigm in literary studies, but certainly Cognitive Poetics sets itself apart, even at this early stage, as a field of study that seeks to uncover the workings of the literary mind, focusing on the mind rather than particular mindsets, and basing observations of particulars, such as authorial style and culturally specific conceptualizations, on empirically based theories of representational cognition.
One of the vital characteristics of cognitive poetics is the orientation toward research done in other fields of study, predominantly within the cognitive sciences. Cognitive-poetic researchers may incorporate methodologies from outside literary studies into their own work, or relate analyses to findings in other areas of research in human cognition, and form generalizing hypotheses that may be if not falsified, in the Popperian sense, then supported or undermined by critical demonstration. This approach is not radically different from the approach taken by someone like Jakobson who based certain analyses of poetic device on contemporary findings in linguistics (cf. e.g. Jakobson 1981) , showing, for instance, that alliteration is a phenomenon grounded in phonemic cognition. The interdisciplinarity in cognitive poetics is not a novelty in and of itself; what is novel is rather the consistent orientation toward shared patterns of thought and emotional responses, and the commitment to continually invite reassessment of one's claims, in the light of what is known about cognition, whether this knowledge, or the tools used to gain knowledge, stems from the literary part of the humanities or from some other branch of science. These observations bring us to the issue of methodology.
Pondering the veracity of scientific hypotheses is a meaningful activity only insofar as the possibility of obtaining knowledge is presupposed, and also, crucially, its meaningfulness depends on the assumption that the meaning expressed by the hypothesis is stable enough to persist while the hypothesis is tested against a body of data. From a logical, and procedural, point of view, anti-representationalism presents a problem to scientific method, and hence to aspirations toward framing literary studies as a science. This is the philosophical predicament facing radical meaning skepticism·, how do you form a theory of meaning denying the existence of stable meanings when the formation of the theory itself presupposes stable meanings?
Insofar as the object one strives to obtain is knowledge, one needs viable methods for evaluating the accuracy of the descriptive and predictive propositions made. As a minimum, the possibility of making accuracy assessments is present as an implied potential. Ideally, the methodology will reveal itself in the execution, or be explicitly stated.
Certainly the scientific ambition is not emphatically absent in all traditional approaches to literature, and certainly within each tradition there are useful practices for producing knowledge (if not about literary cognition then about specific texts). New Criticism, for instance, produced a theoretically founded commitment to demonstration and argumentation. Cognitive-poetic studies are likewise engaged with reading and interpretation, and, like the new-critical approach, sees the text itself as the primary source of validation for specific claims made, but the unique properties of a given text are taken as manifestations of more general functions; the particulars express the utilization of mental procedures common to human minds.
The interpretational practice of uncovering the meanings of texts, and the discovery of the nature of the general functions that help bring them about, invite a heterogeneous methodology. However, because the object of study is the process of meaning construction (and of the elicitation of emotive responses to particular expression-content pairings), interpretive practices cannot simply be replaced by the observational methods applied in the experimentally oriented cognitive sciences. Naturally, the notion of reproducibility applies to textual analysis in a different way than it does in the physical sciences of (physical) presentation, belonging to a science of (mental) representation. The reproducibility of an analysis does not consist in its replication (the production of identical analyses) but rather in the notion of unobjectionability: the notion that other scholars be able to reproduce one's arguments in their minds and not find them objectionable. Finding the claims in a given analysis unobjectionable implies that hypothetically, other analyses of the same material would conceivably produce these same claims, or at least would not contradict them.
Since cognitive poetics has only existed for a few decades, it remains to be seen what the methodological norms will turn out to be, but it seems a point of agreement so far that there be some standards of accountability in place -standards for demonstrating the inaccuracy of previously stated claims, one's own and those of others, and conversely, for supporting one's claims, and claims made by others, so conceptual progress can be made.
If we are to base our methodological choices on the ontologicai properties of the phenomena in question, it seems fitting to include methods suitable for illuminating both the phenomenological (experiential) dimension of literary cognition, as well as the neural and the behavioral dimensions. This liberal approach gives room for cognitive-semantic textual analysis and other interdisciplinary work, borrowing from and including introspective and comparative methodologies in linguistics and literary studies, reader-response studies and other methodologies in the introspective/behavioral interface, as well as neuro-psychological methodologies.
Notwithstanding, central to this new field of cognitive literary studies is the literary focal point of semantic analysis·, wherever one's interest lies, whether it be phenomenological (introspective), behavioral, statistical or neurological, the interpretation of signs remains the primary and fundamental concern. Without descriptions of textual meaning there will be nothing to compare and explain. The interpretive practice of textual comprehension thus persists as the cornerstone of cognitive literary studies, the basic thing allowing any research to take place.
Simply put, literary cognition has two empirical dimensions (discarding the empiricist claim to 'empirical science' as exclusively applicable to ply mal reality): the immaterial dimension of shared representations, manifested in literary minds, and the material manifestation of these immaterial artifacts in the brain. By the same token, performing studies in literary cognition has two overall dimensions: empirical methodologies oriented toward physical reality (including also the perception aspect of reading), and empirical methodologies oriented toward non-physical reality (i.e. experienced meaning and other states of affairs occurring in the mind). Tsur 1992 and 1998 would be instances of work exemplifying the implementation of methodologies reflecting both these empirical dimensions.
Argumentational support for an analysis
The cognitive turn in literary studies brings about a broadening of available methodological practices, including practices used in the natural sciences, yet maintains 'close reading' as its central practice, literary texts being the primary object of interest. The orientation toward research outside the field of literary studies in some cases implies supplementing the reading of texts with other methods of discovery, and other frameworks of analysis (e.g. frameworks developed in linguistics), though it may also simply imply letting one's analyses and generalizations be informed by relevant research in other fields of study.
The cognitive turn also implies an orientation away from norms in traditional 'cultural studies' -the political, historicist, constructivist and genderoriented styles of critique prominent in contemporary academia -that is, away from a focus on circumstances particular to specific persons and communities and towards an inclusive concept of humanity: the human mind.
Being an inherently interpretive, and in this sense semiotic, endeavor, textual comprehension is essentially an introspective practice, in the sense that the meanings analyzed are located in our minds, that is, in our interacting imaginations, rather than in the physiology of our brains or in our exterior environment. Since the subject matter is essentially representational, it would be somewhat misguided to talk about Popperian 'falsification' as a viable standard for judging the accuracy of a given cognitive-poetic analysis (or parts thereof) -at least in the restricted sense that has proved useful in the natural sciences.
Inasmuch as we can talk about falúfying a textual analysis, this falsification is more approximative than the nomenclature might suggest.
Save cases where one can falsify a claim by offering up counterexamples, the act of critiquing, understood as a procedure of 'testing ideas', is more a matter of demonstrating the implausibility of certain interpretations, given the horizon of co-text and the semantic patterns manifested in the text as a whole. Add to that the fact that in many cases a text, as an intentionally ambiguous sign, may provide a basis for several possible interpretations, all equally viable. As far as textual analyús is concerned, it therefore becomes clear that any applied methodology will differ from methodologies evolved for exploring states of affairs not inherendy ambiguous ('suggesting a variety of specific interpretations') or underdetennined ('lending themselves to an indefinite number of interpretations'), states of affairs that do not exist in the realm of imagination (such as, for instance, the cortical activations during visualization of read passages, another interesting subject matter relevant to cognitive poetics).
The critical strategy I describe below is thus not in itself distinctive to cognitive poetics relative to other practices in the Literary branch of the humanities, though its particular implementations may be. As in the formalist tradition, the interpretive task is comprised of two parts: the semantic processing of a text which we call "a reading" -and a literary interpretation based on this prior reading. At an overall level, textual analysis can be said to consist of these three potential dimensions: a reading, a literary interpretation, and an aesthetic evaluation of the text as a work of art, and/or a personal evaluation of the world view expressed.
Interpretive reading Literary interpretation Evaluation 10 ]
While a critique at the two interpretive levels will be technical, critique at the evaluative level will be normative (disagreeing with analyst's evaluation of the poetics or the world view expressed). Here I address the technical aspects of critiquing an analysis: a three-part summary of the viable methods of demonstration a cognitive-poetic critic may have at his disposal in challenging a textual analysis. A critique might:
1) show that aspects of the text have not been taken into account and that the omissions cast doubt on a proposed interpretation rather than support it; 2) argue that certain interpretive assumptions rest on faulty premises, that is, show that certain cognitive operations implicitly or explicitly assumed in justifying a given interpretation are not replicated by other competent readers, or are inconsistent with findings in cognitive science which suggest a different account from the one assumed in the analysis; 3) show that rather than being the product of intersubjective cognition certain interpretations are determined by arbitrar}' ideology or idiosyncratic associations.
While any of these critical strategies are grounded in methodical thinking and serve to 'test', or try, the validity of a given analysis, it would seem misleading to classify them as methods of 'falsification'. These critical strategies are more in line with a judicial norm of 'weighing' the evidence. According to this norm, one would say (as do e.g. Eco and Tsur) that readings, interpretations and critiques can be more or less "legitimate", rather than saying they are "true" or "false". In this paradigm, one can "validate" or "disprove" parts of a given analysis, cf. Eco: "Between the unattainable intention of the author and the arguable intention of the reader there is the transparent intention of the text, which disproves an untenable interpretation" (Eco 1992: 78) . Interestingly, as Eco also observes, there is a methodological ease in invalidating rather than validating interpretations; it is easier to argue against a bad interpretation than it is to assess why a given interpretation is good, or better than others: I think [...] that we can accept a sort of Popperian principle according to which if there are no rules that help to ascertain which interpretations are the 'best' ones, there is at least a rule for ascertaining which ones are 'bad' (Eco 1992: 52) .
This observation reflects the same kind of insight motivating the principle of falsification:
[...] I have stressed that it is difficult to say whether an interpretation is a good one, or not. I have however decided that it is possible to establish some limits beyond which it is possible to say that a given interpretation is a bad and far-fetched one. As a criterion, my quasi-Popperian stricture is perhaps too weak, but it is sufficient in order to recognize that it is not true that everything goes (Eco 1992: 144) .
Two key principles guiding a successful analysis are coherence and comprehensive inclusiveness; readings that do not "contradict other explicit aspects of the text" (Eco 1992: 64) are better than readings that do (cf. (1) above). "How to prove a conjecture about the intentio operisi The only way is to check it upon the text as a coherent whole. This idea, too, is an old one and comes from Augustine (De doctrina Christiana): any interpretation given of a certain portion of a text can be accepted if it is confirmed by, and must be rejected if it is challenged by, another portion of the same text. In this sense the internal textual coherence controls the otherwise uncontrollable drives of the reader" (Eco 1992: 65) .
As can be surmised, rather than being radically innovative, these methodological considerations reflect already familiar ideas, including ones formulated within formalist (cp. e.g. Jakobson) and semiotic (cp. e.g. Eco) traditions of literary criticism, save certain aspects of (3), which open up the possibility of bringing in evidential support from outside the interpretive practice of literary critique.
In my view, the most innovative aspects of cognitive-poetic methodology are an interest in empirical research that goes beyond the study of textual meanings in a particular text; and, more specifically, the orientation towards universal features of human cognition -both in terms of adopting ideas and theoretical frameworks developed in cognitive science, and in terms of shaping a notion of textuality which perceives the literary text as a manifestation of expressive mentation, shaped and constrained by patterns of reasoning, by memory, categorization, image formation, force-dynamic schematization, narrative sequencing, and other cognitive processes which serve ordinary purposes but which can be recruited for the purpose of creating these sophisticated representational artifacts.
Gaining insight into the cognition involved in everyday thought processes and pragmatically oriented text comprehension also helps enlighten our understanding of the representational strategies that do not serve "ordinary purposes", that are specifically literary.
As a final point, I want to bring to mind an aspect of cognitive literary studies which is seldom expressed, namely that literary research and cognitive research may reaprocally inform each other, and contribute to each other's advancement. Literary scholars are naturally attuned to the experience of the interpretive process of producing and comprehending signs (read: literary texts), and to the status of these culturally produced products as exactly that: cultural. Producing and interacting with cultural artifacts is a natural part of human existence. Whereas other branches of cognitive science may have a tendency to shy away from the phenomenology of meaning construction and human reality in general, as it stands today, the appreciation of literary texts (i.e. the objects analyzed) entail a preceding experience, a conscious event, from which an analysis can proceed. Recalling the ambition articulated in Turner (1991) , cognitive poetics appears a promising enterprise in the literary branch of the humanities: "An attempt to reintegrate the study of language and literature as grounded in human cognition is, I suggest, the most likely path to restoring our profession to its natural place as a central cultural and intellectual activity" (Turner 1991: 2) . In time, this initiative may in turn come to influence the yet dominant empiricist paradigm in the cognitive sciences and help establish the cultural dimension of cognition as a vital component, to the advancement of research on representational practices and general semiotic competencies. The interdisciplinary integration may well go in both directions.
